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Abstract: Background and historical information are provided
for the electric power industry from its beginnings to the
present. Major legislation affecting the industry is also
explained. The concept of deregulation is defined. California is
taken as a case study of implemented deregulation, and its
problems are outlined. Steps taken to contain the widespread
problems are examined, and other possible solutions to
California' s problems are offered.

INTRODUCTION
The goal of this paper is to gain an understanding of the
historical structure of the United States' electric utility system
and the changes to this structure currently taking place by
"deregulating" the industry. Throughout the paper, the state of
California is used as a case study of the procedures through
which deregulation is to be accomplished. The degree of
success of California in deregulating its power system is also
examined along with suggestions for improvement.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Electric Utility Beginnings
The modern electric utility industry began in the 1880s with
the need for efficient power delivery for nighttime streetlighting systems. The first major system, which opened on
September 4, 1882 in New York City, was Thomas Edison ' s
Pearl Street electricity generating system. The system initially
supplied 59 customers with electric power, but with the
demand for power for electric motors came the need for a
utility that would be operational 24 hours a day. By the late
1880s, small central stations, located near their end users,
were built in many U.S . cities.
Up to this time, stations were direct current (dc) stations and
were inefficient in transm itting electricity over long distances.
This changed in 1896 with the development of Niagara Falls
by George Westinghouse. This station transmitted electrical
power over 20 miles to Buffalo, New York using an
alternating current (ac) structure. AC transmission is much
more effici ent than DC transmission, especially over long
distances. This results because the power losses in a
transmiss ion line occur as current squared times line
resistance. Thus, higher operating voltages for the same
power output result in lower currents and lower losses.
Because there is no single device that behaves as a DC
transformer (these DC-DC converters came along much later

with the advent of power electronics and still are not as
efficient), AC transmission was chosen as he means of
delivering power. The Niagara Falls plant was the first to
prove that generating stations could be placed some distance
from end-users and still be feasible.
By the beginning of the 20 th century, approximately 40
percent of the electric power generated in the U.S . was
produced by vertically-oriented utilities-utilities which are
responsible for generating, transmitting, and distributing
power. Many businesses still produced their own electricity
for in-house use. As utilities began to install larger and more
efficient generators and transmission networks, industrial
users began to shift their generating needs to those utilities.
Because electrical utilities were natural monopolies,
regulation was a necessity. Many states began their own
public service commissions to deal with the regulation of
these large utilities. Rate-based regulation became the norm .
Electric utility holding companies, which were companies that
owned stock in several utilities, began developing in the early
1900s. [n the 1920s, 94 percent of the electric utility industry
was controlled by holding companies. By the late 1920s, the
16 largest holding companies controlled 75 percent of the
nation ' s generating capacity, and three of these controlled
over half. Because these holding companies owned large
blocks of utilities spanning several states, state regulatory
boards could not control them. As a result, unregulated
holding companies increased prices to increase their own
profits. When several holding companies collapsed, the
federal government had to step in to insure the continued
operation of the industry.

Public Utility Holding Company Act
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA)
was aimed at breaking up and regulating the large holding
companies that controlled much of the nation ' s electric utility
system. Under PUHCA, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) was given the power to break up the large
holding companies. The SEC required the holding companies
to divest themselves of their assets until each company served
a particular geographical area. Holding companies were also
required to register with the SEC, and were permitted by law
only to engage in those activities deemed appropriate for a
single, integrated utility . Under PUHCA, the SEC was

authorized to supervise these holding companies. The SEC
also decided, on a case-by-case basis, whether each registered
utility would need to be regulated or could be exempted from
some requirements of PUHCA.

classified as a renewable, it must produce electricity from a
resource that is renewable or virtually inexhaustible.
Renewable energy sources include solar panels, wind
turbines, and hydroelectric plants.

At first, holding companies resisted the Act. Some even
challenged its constitutionality. All of this ended when the
Supreme Court upheld PUHCA's legal status. By 1950, the
utility reorganizations were virtually complete.

By requiring utilities to purchase power from any QF and
allow it to connect to the power grid, PURPA began the shift
away from a monopolistic electric utility structure to one of
some competition. This shift would continue as new
legislation was enacted.

Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
Energy Policy Act
PUHCA and its policies remained virtually unchanged from
its inception in 1935 through the late 1960s. The electric
power industry continued to meet increased demand with
increased generation and transmission capacity. In October
1973, Nations of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) imposed a ban on oil exports to the United
States. The ban on oil was brought about for several reasons,
the most major of which was the 1973 war between Israel and
Egypt. OPEC threatened to ban petroleum exports to any
countries that did not support the Arab position during the
war. When U.S. President Richard Nixon proposed a $2.2
billion military aid package to Israel, OPEC banned all oil
exports to the United States. Although the ban was lifted in
1974, the months of minimal petroleum production piqued
public interest of energy issues, resulted in higher energy
prices, and contributed to inflation.
The 1973-1974 period prompted Congress to propose and
adopt the National Energy Act in 1978. This plan was
comprised of five major parts: The Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act (PURP A), the Energy Tax Act, the National
energy Conservation Policy Act, the Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Act, and the Natural Gas Policy Act. The
National Energy Act was enacted mainly to reduce the United
States ' dependence on foreign oil and the impact of energy
shortages on price.
PURPA requires utilities to allow any qualifying facility (QF)
to connect to the utility ' s power grid. Utilities are also
required to buy power from these QFs at the avoided cost of
not producing the power themselves. PURP A created a
market in which QFs would be guaranteed a purchaser of their
power. To ease the cost of interconnection to power grids,
Congress exempted most QFs from regulation by the SEC
under PUHCA and from state regulation .
For a non-utility to be classified as a QF, it had to meet one of
two basic criteria: cogeneration or renewable resource.
Cogenerators are generators that produce two distinct types of
power either simultaneously or sequentially using the same
fuel source. One example of this is a petroleum processing
plant, which uses natural gas to produce electricity; the waste
heat from combustion is used to create hot water and steam
used in the plant for thermal processes. For a generator to be

Even before the passage of PURP A, many groups had
attempted to change the policies set forth in PUHCA. These
changes finally began with the passage of PURPA by
allowing non-utilities to enter the electricity generation
market. With the passage of the Energy Policy Act (EPACT)
of 1992 by President George Bush, the electric utility industry
could shift from a monopolistic structure to one of
competition.
EPACT created a new class of electrical generators called
Exempt Wholesale Generators (EWGs). Like QFs, EWGs are
exempt from PUHCA constraints of SEC regulation. Unlike
QFs, EWGs did not have to meet the cogenerator or
renewable classification, and utilities do not have to purchase
power from them. Thus, EWGs introduced a truly competitive
element to the electric utility industry.
Besides allowing EWGs to enter the wholesale power supply
market, EPACT also changed the transmission grid access
available to non-utilities. These changes have led to openaccess electric power transmission grid for wholesale
transactions; in other words, any producer may connect to the
grid and produce power, although no one is required to buy it.
Non-utilities have to pay a fee to the grid owners for this
access, but this fee is set at a "just and reasonable" rate by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).

DEREGULATION
What it is & How it Works
Deregulation refers to the process by which the electric utility
system changes from a regulated, monopolistic environment
to a competitive environment. Historically, most utilities are
vertically-oriented. That is, the utilities generate, transmit, and
distribute electrical power to the end-users. In a deregulated
market, a single utility still owns and operates both the
transmission system and the distribution system; this would
still be the most efficient way of transmitting power, as it
would require one single, consolidated electrical network.
Generators, on the other hand, are owned and operated by
private companies in a competitive environment. Under this

system, electrical consumers are allowed to choose from
which generator they would like to buy. Thus, generation
becomes a competitive market in the hopes that by fueling
competition, prices for the consumer will ultimately decrease,
or at least not increase as fast as with the regulated system.

CASE STUDY: CALIFORNIA
California's Deregulation Decision
Many factors came into play when California's legislature
chose to move to a deregulated system. In April 1996, FERC
issued Orders 888 and 889. Order 888 required all electric
utilities operating within the U.S. to have a nondiscriminatory access tariff for those facilities wishing to
connect to the utilities' transmission systems to produce power
available to customers. Order 889 established the Open
Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS), which
forced utilities to make information regarding transmission
access and prices available to the public. These orders also
forced utilities to abandon any practice of favoring their own
generation capabilities over those of non-utilities, thus paving
the way for a competitive market in any state. After FERC
issued Orders 888 and 889, California decided to deregulate
its entire system. In 1996, California had the tenth highest
electricity price rate of the 50 states and the District of
Columbia. Long before its decision to deregulate, California
has had rates approximately 50 percent higher than the rest of
the country.
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The CaIPX, which was regulated by FERC, served as a public
auction for the buying and se\ling of electricity. The three
largest power-producing IOUs- Pacific Gas & Electric
(PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE), and San Diego
Gas & Electric (SDG&E}--were required by law to sell their
power to the CaIPX. Any other generators, even those located
out of state, had the option of selling their power to the CalPX
if they wished to do so. The CalPX would accept bids to
purchase a certain quantity of power at a given price. The
CalPX then gets bids from generators until it has purchased
the demanded power at the lowest possible price. This created
a "spot market" in which electricity prices changed on an
hourly basis. PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E were forced to buy
their power from the CaIPX for four years after its inception
to sell to utility customers .
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The ISO was responsible for insuring fair and impartial access
to the transmission grid for all generators whi le maintaining
reliable operation. Although the transmission system would
continue to be owned by the investor-owned utilities (TOUs)
as before the change, the ISO would control the network. The
ISO insured that no company could block the access of
another, and it charged fees required to keep the system
operational and reliable.

Problems with the California System
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j

AB 1890 created many changes in California's system. Rates
were frozen at the June 10, 1996 level, and residential and
small commercial users were given a ten- percent rate
reduction from those levels. These rates were to remain frozen
until March 31 , 2002. An independent system operator (ISO)
and the California Public Exchange (CaIPX) were created;
both were independent of the utilities and th us could not be
controlled by them.
.
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Figure I - Plot of the monthly average electricity cost per kilowatthour versus time for both Califomia and the entire U.S. Peaks occur
during the summer months.
Because of the historically high electricity costs, California
took steps to reduce these costs. On September 23 , 1996,
Governor Pete Wilson signed into law Assembly Bill (AB)
1890, which was responsible for transitioning California's
electricity industry to a competitive market. This transition
would take place over a four-year period beginning March
31 , 1998.

California's deregulated system worked fairly well for about
two years after its inception, with prices remaining stable and
the utilities able to meet demand. During the summer of2000,
however, electricity prices in California skyrocketed to reach
an all-time high. Generation capacity shortages, both within
California and outside of it, also contributed to rolling
blackouts in Northern California. The problems with
California's deregulated electric utility system can be grouped
into three broad categories: very high volatility in wholesale
electricity prices, intermittent power shortages (rolling
blackouts), and severe financial problems of the three largest
IOUs (PG&E, SCE, & SDG&E).

High Wholesale Prices
Wholesale electricity prices on the CalPX began increasing
around June 2000, and continued to do so through the
remainder of the year. Prices rose approximately 270 percent
from the June-July period in 1999 to the same period in 2000.
From December 1999 to December 2000, wholesale prices

rose from 2.971¢ per kilowatt-hour (kWh) to 37.699¢ per
kWh, an increase of approximately 1000 percent.
These high prices can be linked to several factors, one of
which is the high price of natural gas, which began escalating
in the summer of 2000 and reached an unprecedented high
during the fall and winter of2000.
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Figure 2 - Plot of the monthly average cost per million cubic feet
($!Mcf) of natural gas for both California and the U.S.

Natural gas prices have a significant effect on the prices of
power in California for two major reasons: generators burning
natural gas accounted for 38% of California's total generation
in 2000, and power generators using natural gas have to
compete with residential and industrial users for the same
fuel. Because of the huge spike in natural gas prices in
December 2000, California's electricity prices rose
drastically.
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Figure 3 - Chart of the types of electrical generation in California in
2000 with each type's percentage of the total.

Natural gas prices rose for several reasons, the most
prominent of which is the deregulation of the natural gas
industry around this time. Because the majority of California's
generation is fueled by natural gas, the electric system was
effected.
Also, increasing demand for the fuel played a part. Simply
put, natural gas is an excellent residential heating fuel, as well
as an efficient method of producing electrical power from gas
turbines. When demand increased in industrial, residential,
and utility sectors, prices rose. The increased demand also
forced natural gas companies to lower their reserve stocks to
an all-time low, effectively raising prices as well.
Aside from the increased demand, an EI Pas natural gas
pipeline explosion in August 2000 factored into the price
increases. Even after repairs, the federal government shut
down portions of the pipeline when investigators found
internal corrosion at the breakage site and other areas. This
pipeline supplies a significant portion of California's natural
gas demand.
The high wholesale prices in turn created high retail prices for
customers of SDG&E. In July 1999, the rate freeze was
eliminated for SDG&E, and the high prices beginning in the
summer of2000 were passed on to retail customers.

Intermittent Power Shortages
Power shortages in California were another reason for the
severe electricity problems the state faced. These occurred for
several reasons. One reason is the lack of investment in new
power plants. From 1990 to 1999, California's in-state
generation capability decreased by two percent, whereas the
demand for electricity rose 11 percent during the same period.
In fact, no new generation had been built in California during
that entire time.
California also relies on a significant amount of out-of-state
hydroelectric power, much of which is located in the
Northwestern U.S. During the times of peak prices,
hydroelectric power production was reduced in the Northwest
due to low water levels .
Out-of-state producers exacerbated these blackouts in other
ways. During this period of high wholesale costs and fixed
retail prices, out-of-state companies refused to sell needed
power to the three main California 10Us because of their
questionable financial status. Because California traditionally
relies on imports (11 % in 2000), power was not available for
customers.

Financial Problems of the Three Largest IOUs
The third broad reason for deregulation problems in
California was the severe financial problems of PG&E, SCE,

and SDG&E, the state's three-largest !OUs. As is mentioned
previously, the three IOUs lost huge amounts of money
because of the retail price fix. Because of increasing
wholesale costs, the IOUs could not pass the prices increases
onto customers. PG&E has had the worst financial trouble: on
April 6, 2001, it filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy. PG&E
estimated its non-recoverable costs at $9 billion. In November
2000, SCE estimated its non-recoverable costs at $2.6 billion.
That number has since increased beyond $6 billion. Because
SDG&E's price fix was eliminated, it did not incur as much
debt; however, SDG&E estimated its own non-recoverable
costs at $747 million.
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Figure 4 - Plot of generation in California versus time. This plot is
introduced specifically to show California' s historical reliance on
imported power.

What Should be Done
There are several possible measures that California can take to
save its failing electric system. These are discussed below.

Add More Generation Capabilities

Year

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total

1914
185
0
0
0
2099

Pending (MW)
Pending
Year

2002
2003
2004
2005
Total

349
214
7840
2890
11293

0
3631.4
9894
1600
0
15125.4
Total (MW)

28517.4

Aside from this, the power plants should be designed to use
certain types of fuel: namely, those fuels that either have a
regulated price, or those fuels that are not used by residences
for heating or other uses (natural gas). By using these types of
fuels, price projections are more easily made, and supply
interruptions cannot cause intermittent price surges.

Bail out the Indebted IOUs
California's three largest IOUs have all suffered severe
financial trouble as a result of the deregulation plan. Since
these IOUs are responsible for producing and controlling the
majority of California's power, the state should step in to give
monetary aid to these companies. Aside from issuing bonds,
California should allow these companies to charge higher
rates when wholesale prices are low (as they are now). This
would allow for some cost recovery, and the IOUs would
eventually be creditworthy.
California has allowed some of these activities since the
problems first occurred. In December 2000, California
allowed the three largest IOUs to purchase power from
sources other than the CalPX if they chose to do so. CalPX
was discontinued in January 2001, and PG&E, SCE, and
SDG&E were given leave to raise rates to recover costs. More
rate hikes were approved in March 2001.

Return to the Price-Regulated System

T abl e I Summary 0 fP ower PI an t Cons truc IOn Pro~ects
Approved (MW)
Under
Operational
Construction

Figure 4 shows California's historical reliance on imported
power. For California to be self-reliant, it must add much
more generation capacity. Governor Gray Davis has approved
some projects in light of the electricity shortages, but it will
not be until mid-2003 before California can fully provide its
own power. By the end of 2005, California should have
enough generation resources to be able to supply itself with
power even when some power plants are offline for both
planned and unplanned maintenance.

Total

1914
3816.4
9894
1600
0
17224.4

Electricity is critical for everyday operation, and as such, its
prices and supply should remain stable. When done
improperly, deregulation can cause instabilities (as is the case
with California).
The power companies should be able to purchase power longterm. This helps to keep prices stable by allowing fixed rates
for the duration of the contract.
One reason for California's decision to deregulate was the
state's historically higher electricity rates when compared to
the national average. However, there are several reasons that
California should have higher rates. One prominent reason is
the strict environmental stance of the state; another is the high
risk of earthquakes. Californians, by virtue of their chosen
living location, should expect to pay higher rates to offset the

costs investors must pay to build and maintain generation
facilities in that state.

build coal- or nuclear-powered plants, and because of this
residents should expect to pay more for their power.

California has attempted to achieve these goals with mild
success. On March 21, 2002, the state passed laws completely
suspending retail choice (the hallmark of a deregulated
system) as of September 20, 2002 for all customers except
those with preexisting contracts. As the law stands now,
however, those customers with the contracts would not be
fiscally responsible for the debts previously incurred by the
state.

In summation, California's utility industry was never broken
before the deregulation decision. Because the electric system
is so critical for everyday operation, it should never have been
altered.

California has also been instrumental in purchasing long-term
power contracts to insure a stable supply. As of this point, the
state has purchased approximately $45 billion in electrical
contracts. Governor Gray Davis made these deals at the height
of the state' s power crisis; since then, power prices at the
wholesale level have fallen off significantly. The state's
Public Utilities Commission (PUC), working with Governor
Davis, is currently attempting to reduce the cost of these
contracts by $21 billion, but that appears to have little chance
of success. As it stands now, the state expects to lose eighty
cents on every dollar spent on these contracts.
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Although California has had historically higher electricity
prices when compared to the U.S. average, those prices were
stable. As such, California residents and industries could plan
for those power costs far into the future. Before the
deregulation decision, the cost-of-living in California was
approximately 40% higher than the national average;
electricity costs are about 50% greater. Californians have
chosen to implement strict environmental laws and refuse to

